Existentialism is the discussion of our being in an attempt to reconcile our purpose for being. A central idea within existentialist thought is the authenticity of being, how can we become ourselves? Many consider the limitations we place on ourselves that hinder our progress to full self-realization in an attempt to rid ourselves of a predetermined outcome. Essentially, we are what we make ourselves, but are we really? These ideas present an interesting discussion as we are forced to question, how do we attain this level of existence?

There are different approaches to the subject of authenticity. Can we discuss what it means to be authentic or does that make that discussion inauthentic? Do we discuss what it means to be inauthentic in order to reveal what is authentic? For existentialists the idea of authenticity is far from what society has presented through institutions of religion and universal morality. Instead we are left with often-abstract notions of how we are able to understand our being and its authenticity.

To discuss authenticity by way of rejecting preconceived notions of what it means to be, existentialists must consider that they aren’t replacing one institution with another. As Golomb points out the reader must simply be “enticed into authenticity” (18). We find that existentialist writers like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre did not aim to explain authenticity, rather they were concerned with initiated the internal dialogue of the reader. The argument can be made that to some extent it’s impossible not to suggest how to think about something by simply posing questions, this is why much of the existentialist literature is not traditionally accessible literature. Heidegger had to redefine the very basis of language to comfortably discuss our existence. Telling someone to not think about an elephant is a self defeating statement, and so existentialists must carefully craft their arguments without suggesting that there is in fact even such a thing as an elephant.

We are left with vague inclinations of what it means to be an authentic being. Some offer portraits of authenticity, we find examples like Kierkegaard’s knight of faith and Nietzsche’s Overman, two very mythical descriptions of individuals that personify their ideas of authenticity. Others like Heidegger and Sartre attempt to bring the discussion to an ontological level whereby they discuss the very structure of being itself in terms of the relationship between beings.

The problem with these discussions and not-discussions of authenticity is that they do provide, to whatever extent, the idea that we can somehow achieve a level of being that enables us to determine how we will become, but at the same time they admit there is no way to know if someone has achieved authenticity of being. So the question becomes, is it possible to be authentic or is it something we simply die trying for? Of those individuals capable of recognizing their own authenticity, none of the existentialist thinkers approached this station of being. We are left then to pick up the pieces and try in our own capacity to understand what constitutes the authenticity of being. By considering the failed approaches of previous existentialists we might be able to surmise our own understanding, which is undoubtedly the ultimate point of existentialism.

Kierkegaard uses the story of Abraham to illustrate his concept of authenticity through self-realization. There are three stages of life, the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious, but according to Kierkegaard we can only know self-realization in the religious stage. Each stage is a particular mode of existence. The aesthetic stage is most basic, where we lack purpose or direction and are simply concerned the material aspects of life, disregarding our social and moral responsibilities. The ethical stage is where we recognize that we have an obligation to uphold certain values, as we are responsible to others for our actions. Lastly, the religious stage adds a the individual responsibility to our actions, we are able to redefine our values with a more complete understanding of how our decisions will effect ourselves and others. The only way to authentically live is, as Kierkegaard describes, being a knight of faith; this is by reaching the third stage of our life.

In order to make the leap from the ethical to religious, objectivity must be abandoned. The Biblical story of Abraham illustrates the absurdity and irrationality necessary to make this leap to faith. The movement from ethical to religious is described in two instances, the first being infinite resignation and the second being belief in the absurd. This concept is paradoxical, as at first we must accept that what we desire is unattainable, and then we are able to believe irrationally that we will still fulfill that desire.

The first movement toward faith, infinite resignation, is where we must come to terms with our desires and accept that they are unattainable, that we have no power over objective truths. Accepting that we have to power to change our outcome, Kierkegaard suggests the second movement is recognized as the belief in the absurdity. This movement requires, what is described as, taking the leap of faith. We take this leap of faith by accepting without rational explanation that we could at the same instance, with the help of God, overcome the inevitable. This can be seen as a suspension of traditional morality and ethics in order to make a connection between reality and absurdity. But as Kierkegaard points out this connection is never rationalized, as there are no reasonable methods for understanding faith. By recognizing this we become a knight of faith, free from the despair created by our ethical or aesthetic stage of life.

There is one major flaw within Kierkegaard’s ideal of authenticity and that is he has admittedly “not found any reliable example of the knight of faith” (49). The only examples provided stem from a mythological idealism, and it becomes hard to grasp if authenticity is even possible from this perspective.

Nietzsche’s approach is similar to Kierkegaard where he defines a character that represents the ideal authentic being. The concept of the Overman (Übermensch) is someone who is able to overcome him or herself by recognizing the external influences present in their being. This ability is described as the will to power and is manifest through our rejection of traditional morality for morality based on the advancement of the individual, master morality. Nietzsche rejects religion as it attempts to define a traditional morality and as a result stifles the progression of our being.

Golomb discusses the two stages that must occur in order to reach authenticity. The first is liberation from all “external layers imposed…by institutional conditioning” (Golomb 72). The second stage is the conscious adoption of moral norms, some of which will have been discarded in the first stage, however they are obtained on the basis of authenticity and not some dogmatic hegemony.

One way to rid us of these external layers is to consider that “God is dead”. Nietzsche explores this idea as without God we are without external moral constraints placed on our actions. That is not to say there are no moral constraints, but we must create these values for ourselves. Objectivity limits our potential of self-realization and so we must overcome those ethical obstacles that hinder our true freedom.

In order to approach authenticity we must first embrace the idea of eternal recurrence whereby we can accept the value judgments we make for eternity and without regret as we know them to be the clearest of decisions. As we continue through our the stages of our lives by consciously adopting moral norms and exercising our authentic free choice we bring ourselves closer and closer to this notion of authenticity. But the question arises, at what stage do we achieve this authenticity of being? There is no indication of measure, no example to go by, we are lost to decide what is the Übermansch.

Following the ideas presented by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, existential thought takes a significant detour to address the metaphysical presuppositions of what it is to be. Heidegger is initially concerned with clarifying that previous ideas on authenticity and the authenticity of being supported the institutionalized notions of philosophy set up by the likes of Plato.

Heidegger introduces the term Dasein to describe the particular mode of being that is inherent to human beings; it’s a description of our relationship to the world, and is defined as our Being-there. Authenticity, according to Heidegger, represents the ability to reveal our Dasein to ourselves. There are two primary methods for discovering our Being-there.

The first method is state-of-mind; this is described as “our mood, our Being-attuned” (Heidegger 172). Dasien always has some mood as “moods can deteriorate” and “change over” (173). We are constantly in a state-of-mind whether it’s good or bad, it’s the nature of being, attuned to our “everyday concern” (173). This everyday concern reveals to us our Dasein, as Heidegger points out, “In having a mood, Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has been delivered over in its Being; and in this way it has been delivered over to the Being which, in existing, it has to be” (173).

Understanding accompanies state-of-mind as the second method as it expresses a means to reveal the potential present to address our mood. Our understanding reveals how to deal with our mood as it “has in itself the existential structure which we call “projection”” (Heidegger 184-5). The ability to recognize this projection is our ability to see the possibilities of the future, it’s what enables us to become, it isn’t adhering to a set plan, rather it’s knowing that the future holds only possibilities.

Authenticity and inauthenticity is thus relative to Dasein. Heidegger describes authenticity as choosing to make a choice for one’s self apart from the “they” which is the factical potentiality-for-Being (313). Dasein can slip between this factical or state-of-mind potentiality-for-Being and the projected potentiality-for-Being, this can be described as its movement between the authentic and inauthentic states of being. However, it’s clear that we don’t maintain this authenticity and as such we unable to attain a consistent and true authenticity of being.

Similarly, for Sartre authenticity is not something necessarily maintained once it’s achieved. Authenticity is first defined by not having, what Sartre describes as, Bad Faith. This Bad Faith is the misconception that we are acting freely where we are truly confining our freedom in favor of societal boundaries. This idea is closely related to Sartre’s view of existence preceding essence, do we create our own essence or are we created with that essence?

Sartre does clarify that essence does precede existence in most things, except for human beings. He gives the example of the paper cutter and how before someone makes a paper cutter he or she must first conceive the object and plan to make the object with the intended purpose to cut paper. In this case we see that the essence of the object is created before the object is even made. All things created are made with the intention to fulfill a specific function.

However this does not consider man, if we are to consider that God creates man we can apply the same logic, however if we don’t believe in God there is no established purpose for man. From this perspective man is created without an essence, and must seek his own determination for what he is to become. In this case we can then say existence precedes essence, as Sartre explains, “man exists, turns up, appears on the scene, and only afterwards, defines himself” (310).

If we consider that we have been created then we are acting in Bad Faith, as we are confining ourselves to a definition we suppose was intended for us prior to our existence. This would be reflected as being inauthentic, but this can’t be avoided. Like Heidegger, Sartre’s view of authenticity and inauthenticity is not something static to our nature of being. Sartre mentions in his War Diaries that considered himself, at one point or another, to be somewhat authentic, “I rather think I was authentic before my leave” (279). However, Sartre posits that in every instance we must reevaluate our authenticity in that situation and a “new authenticity has to be invented” (279).

We end with more questions than when we started, but this is perhaps the purpose of existential inquiry, to question ad infinitum. If there is one singular point to gather from all of these thinkers it’s that we can gather no real semblance of authenticity from any of them. Authenticity remains as vague and unattainable as they have envisaged it, and therein is the absurdity of existential thought, for in itself it is a paradox. How then are we able to recognize, for ourselves, if we have reached this station of being authentic, if our notions of authenticity are to be ideas hinted at by inauthentic beings? There is no right answer, and so in a way we can say that every answer is wrong in its inability to prove that it’s the right answer.

Works Cited

  • Golomb, Jacob. In Search of Authenticity. New York: Routledge, 1995. Print.
  • Kierkegaard, Søren. Fear and Trembling and Sickness Unto Death. Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954. Print.
  • Sartre, Jean-Paul. “Sartre Selections.” Existentialist Philosophy: An Introduction. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1996. 242-335. Print.
  • Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. New York: Harper & Row, 1962. Print.